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## EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY MALAYA AND THE BUGIS

We have read in the previous chapter how Sultan Ibrahim of Johore obtained Bugis mercenary assistance against Jambi and how these mercenaries had been extremely useful to him. We will now learn how the Bugis were to return to Malaya again to provide mercenary help to the Johore Sultan in another struggle against invaders from Sumatra. On their first visit to Johore the Bugis had recognized how useful had been their help. The second occasion was to confirm their indispensable ability. As it turned out the Bugis decided that the Malay Peninsula would be able to provide them with plenty of opportunities for war and wealth, settlement and prosperity. Once they had been brought to Malaya the Bugis were to prove extremely difficult to dislodge. They were to attack and ravage both Kedah and Perak, they were to cause considerable discomfort to the Dutch, they were to become the rulers of the Johore Empire, in practice if not in name, and finally they were to establish sufficient settlements in the area which is now Selangor for them to establish their own sultanate. Thus it can be seen that a great part of Malaya's history in the eighteenth century has to do with Bugis.

The Bugis came from the Celebes Islands in the eastern part of the Indonesian Archipelago, and more especially they set sail from the port of Macassar. They were extremely skilful

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Trong chương trước, chúng ta đã học về cách thức quy tụ những người lính đánh thuê Bugis của Sultan Ibrahim ở Johore chống lại Jambi và vai trò hỗ trợ cực kỳ lớn của những người lính đánh thuê này cho ông ta. Bây giờ chúng ta sẽ tìm hiểu cách thức mà người Bugis quay trở lại Malaysia, trở thành lính đánh thuê cho Johore Sultan trong một cuộc đấu tranh chống lại những kẻ xâm lược từ Sumatra. Trong chuyến đi đầu tiên của họ tới Johore, người Bugis đã nhận ra được vai trò đặc biệt của mình. Và với lần thứ 2 này vai trò của họ đã được khẳng định hơn bao giờ hết. Cuối cùng, người Bugis quyết định rằng bán đảo Mã Lai có thể mang lại cho họ rất nhiều cơ hội về chiến tranh và sự giàu có, ổn định và thịnh vượng. Một khi đã được đưa đến Malaysia, người Bugis rất khó để bị trục xuất. Họ đã tấn công và tàn phá cả Kedah và Perak, họ đã gây ra nhiều khó khăn đáng kể cho Hà Lan, họ đã trở thành những người cai trị của đế quốc Johore. Từ những con người vô danh, cuối cùng, họ đã thành lập được các khu định cư trong khu vực mà bây giờ còn gọi là Selangor để thiết lập vương quốc riêng. Như vậy, ta có thể thấy rằng một phần lớn lịch sử Malaysia ở thế kỷ thứ mười tám gắn liền sự nghiệp của người Bugis.

Người Bugis đến từ các hòn đảo Celebes, nằm ở phía đông của quần đảo Indonesia, và điều đặc biệt hơn là họ giăng buồm rời khỏi cái nôi của mình từ cảng Macassar. Họ là những thủy thủ

sailors, and the fleets became well known among the traders of South-East Asia; Francis Light called them the best merchants among the eastern islands. The ugis were also fierce warriors; this plus skilful seamanship enabled ^their adventurous instincts to be given full scope. From the middle of |he seventeenth century, the Bugis fleets had begun to appear in many parts of the Archipelago. They were willing to hire themselves out as mercenary soldiers, but they were also interested in places for settlements, particularly areas that were sparsely populated. Thus, they; took to the area now known as Selangor lying between the Perak- River and the Minangkabau settlements south of Klang and in Sunger Ujong. By 168 r the Bugis had begun to settle in moderately small; numbers in this area.

#### RIVALRY IN THE JOHORE SULTANATE

It was the misfortunes of the Johore Sultanate which gave the Bugis the greatest opportunity to transfer their centre of interest from the outlying area of Selangor to the more central position of Riau. In 1718 Johore became involved in a quarrel with the Minangkabau state of Siak in Sumatra. The cause of the quarrel is obscure but it may well have been due to the tyrannical rule of Johore by the Sultan's younger brother who had by this time taken over the government of the state: The Sultan's brother was very much a supporter of the Bugis faction at the Johore court and the increasing influence of the Bugis was resented by the other Malay chiefs, especially those who had always opposed the Bendahara family. These

cực kỳ tài giỏi, và các đội tàu của họ trở nên nổi tiếng trong số các tàu buôn ở Đông Nam Á; Thuyền trưởng Francis Light gọi họ là những thương gia giỏi nhất thuộc các hòn đảo nằm phía đông. Người Bugis cũng là những chiến binh hung tợn; khả năng đi biển khéo léo càng làm cho bản năng mạo hiểm của họ trở nên hoàn thiện. Từ giữa thế kỷ XVII, các đội tàu Bugis đã bắt đầu xuất hiện ở nhiều nơi trên quần đảo. Họ sẵn sàng cho việc trở thành những người lính đánh thuê, nhưng họ cũng thích những nơi có thể định cư, đặc biệt là những vùng dân cư thưa thớt. Vì thế, họ chuyển đến vùng hiện nay có tên gọi là Selangor nằm giữa sông Perak và khu Minangkabau phía nam của Klang và ở Sunger Ujong. Vào năm 168, số người Bugis định cư ở khu vực này tương đối nhỏ.

khác

triều đại

same chiefs were to be the supporters of Raja Kechil, a Sumatran prince who was now to become involved in the affairs of the Johore Empire. The sultan, Abdul Jalil, had been considered a good ruler. He is described by an English sea captain, Alexander Hamilton, as ‘a prince of great moderation and justice who governed well while he held the government in his own hands’.<sup>1</sup>

However by 1718 Sultan Abdul Jalil no longer ‘held the government in his own hands’ and Raja Kechil, the ruler of Siak, descended on the Johore capital with his forces to drive out the Sultan’s brother and his supporters. The Johore forces were largely unprepared for this attack—in fact many in Johore were already supporters of the attacking army—and Raja Kechil had little difficulty in overcoming the forces of the Sultan’s brother. The Sultan himself, after first submitting to the invader, very soon fled to Pahang where he was assassinated on Raja Kechil’s orders. The latter now proclaimed himself Sultan of Johore, a position which he maintained for four years. In 1719 he moved the capital of his newly acquired kingdom from the Johore River to Riau, for he considered the latter easier to defend. This move

It is interesting that in 1703 the Sultan offered to give the island of Singapore to Hamilton who replied he did not want it himself but that the island would be a suitable place for a trading company to have a colony. The reason which he gave was very

mục      biết lẽ phải      đúng

khá nhiều

mệnh lệnh

similar to that which later appealed to Raffles, namely that Singapore lay in the centre of the trade of South-East Asia. \*j

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is noteworthy because the capital of Johore never returned to the area of the Johore River, an area which it had occupied off and on since 1540. The capital was to remain away from the mainland until the final disintegration of the Johore Empire in 1812. Raja Kechil himself was probably little more than an adventurer, and as it turned out he was not strong enough to stem the rising tide of Bugis influence. However he was the last Malay leader to put up strong resistance to the [encroachments of these warriors from the Celebes. In the end he failed, especially in the Malay Peninsula, which very soon was ; dominated by the Bugis. In 1722 Raja Kechil himself was driven out of Riau and forced back to Siak by Bugis attacks which were aimed at re-establishing a Bugis-supported ruler of Johore. From Siak, Raja [Kechil continued the fight until the 1740's, appearing here and there in the Straits to help those who were resisting the Bugis. In 1724 he was active in Kedah where a campaign against the Bugis lasted for two- f years. He died finally in 1745, the upholder of a lost cause.

THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF THE BUGIS |

Meanwhile in 1722 the Bugis had returned in strength to Johore, and their forces led by Daeng Perani and

đất  
chia cắt cuối  
liên  
cùng  
nhưng cuối cùng  
mạnh mẽ  
đảo  
bán

TẦM ẢNH HƯỞNG SÂU RỘNG CỦA NGƯỜI BUGIS

his four brothers—Daeng Merambun, Daeng Merewah, Daeng Chelak and Daeng Kemboja— \*?put back on the throne the eldest son of the Bendahara Sultan. His 'title was Sultan Sulaiman Badr al-Alam Shah but he was sultan only fin name, as were to be all his descendants during the remainder of the ^eighteenth century. The Bugis placed him on the throne as a puppet jiuler, as someone who would obtain the allegiance of the Johore population. They also appointed a Bugis under-King, or Yang di-Per-'Uan Muda, who was in fact the real power behind the throne. All [•power was therefore in the hands of the Bugis, but they ruled through iihe figurehead of the Sultan. The first under-King was Daeng Merewah, jbut although the Bugis were now in control of Johore they were not particularly interested in the state itself. They were far more interested \$n using it as their base for operations against the other states of the peninsula. Johore itself they largely neglected, and it was during the Bugis period of dominance that the Johore Empire finally broke up.

Already established in Selangor, the Bugis first of all turned their attention to the northern states on the west coast—Kedah and then lerak. We have stated above that the Bugis began their campaigns by Intervening in Kedah to defeat Raja Kechil. The fighting in Kedah pasted almost two years (1724-6), and the damage to Kedah's trade waft enormous. Daeng Perani himself was killed during the fighting butj ultimately the Bugis were successful. The first under-King, Daeng

Vua ông  
ấy chỉ làm vua trên danh nghĩa

chỉ đạo thông qua các vị vua bù nhìn

bại

hi sinh

giành thắng lợi

Merewah, died in 1728, and he was succeeded in that office by his brother, Daeng Chelak. Perak was now in the unfortunate position of being between the Bugis in Selangor and their Minangkabau supported rivals in Kedah. Neither side was content to have Perak remain a buffer state, but both wished to ensure that their rivals were not established there. As a result Perak was invaded from both quarters. One such Bugis invasion occurred in 1742 and on this occasion due to quarrels among the Perak chiefs some of them joined the Bugis. This group was able to capture the regalia, and the Raja Muda was made an alternative sultan. Thus for about eight years there were two sultans in Perak and as a result of Bugis interference the state was sharply divided.

Another important event took place in 1742. This was the creation of Raja Lumu, a son of Daeng Chelak, as the first sultan of Selangor. This illustrates the permanence of Bugis settlement in the Peninsula and also the strength of their position, for they were thus able to establish a new dynasty. Selangor was for some years in the 1740's the centre of their influence and when Daeng Kemboja became the third under-King in 1745 he did not even bother to go to Riau to obtain the Sultan of Johore's approval. This lack of interest in Johore and its dependencies by the Bugis encouraged the Sultan to think about a more independent line of action in liaison with the Dutch.

ủng hộ việc là một  
vùng đất trung lập  
đối phương  
của họ không thiết lập đế chế lớn mạnh  
ở đó

đoạt được những biểu trưng  
của nhà vua và do vậy

người

thậm chí còn không

The Dutch were naturally becoming worried by the expansion of Bugis influence in the Peninsula for they saw this as a threat to their trade monopoly. The fighting spirit of the Bugis made them formidable: able rivals. Realizing that the Dutch were also suffering from Bugis activity, the Johore Sultan was encouraged to approach them with a view to obtaining Dutch assistance, against the under-King. A treaty was in fact made between Johore and the Dutch authorities in 1745, by which, in return for their help, the Dutch were to be given Siak; though it is doubtful whether Johore's control over Siak was strong enough to make this cession definitely possible.

Despite a further treaty between Johore and the Dutch in 1755 the results of the fighting which took place between the Bugis and the Dutch were inconclusive. Johore gained only a temporary respite from the Bugis when the under-King moved to the island of Lingga. However Dutch attempts to aid the Sultan of Johore were sufficient to widen the breach between themselves and the Bugis. Thus in 1758 after a Dutch all-day attack on Lingga, the Bugis landed outside Malacca causing considerable damage in the suburbs, and it was some months before they were driven back into Selangor. The Dutch, although they were successful in preventing the fall of Malacca, began to lose interest in their support of Johore and by 1758 the Bugis were back again in Riau. The following

đồ bộ



year Sultan Sulaiman of Johore died, leaving his state much smaller than he had found it.

The Johore Empire had by this time virtually ceased to exist; Siak now had its own ruler as did Selangor. The area inland from Malacca was controlled by the Minangkabau inhabitants, Johore was hardly Administered at all, and all that remained was Riau itself. The two succeeding sultans, Abdul Jalil and his son Ahmad, both died by 1761, and despite the protests of the Malay chiefs, the Bugis insisted on putting on the throne Mahmud, the infant grandson of Sultan Sulaiman who was one year old. It meant, of course, that all administrative power now certainly lay with under-King Daeng Kemboja, and the interests of Johore were completely subordinated to those of the Bugis. One result of this Bugis domination was the elimination of friction between the Malays and the Bugis and the removal, for the time being, of the Dutch excuse for interference. During the later 1760's and 1770's relations between the Bugis and the Dutch were fairly cordial, for the Dutch themselves were not able to maintain their own monopolistic position against other European rivals.

One of the most remarkable of the Bugis leaders came to the height of his eventful career at this time. His name was Raja Haji, and he became under-King himself when Daeng Kemboja died in 1777. Raja Haji was perhaps the most renowned of all the Bugis warrior captains, as Windstedt says 'the fighter whom every ruler wanted on his side'. He was the son of Daeng Chelak, the

cháu trai

Ở giai đoạn này, một trong những thủ lĩnh kiệt xuất của người Bugis đã đạt đến đỉnh cao sự nghiệp

second under-King and the ^brother of Raja Lumu, the first sultan of Selangor—and he might be described as the Bugis mercenary par excellence. His early life was in fact spent in fighting in various parts of the Malayan Archipelago [on behalf of an assortment of rulers—Jambi, Indragiri and Pontianak [in Borneo, amongst others. He was by the 1760's the principal assistant Pof Daeng Kemboja, with the title of To' Klana.

It was to Kedah that Raja Haji first turned his attention at this |time—Kedah being far enough north to be free from much Dutch |control and fairly free from the Bugis as well. On his way to Kedah £with his brother, the Sultan of Selangor, Raja Haji spent some time on hi visit to Perak where he demanded that the Sultan of Perak's niece

70 The Making of Modern Malaya should marry his brother. The Bugis then continued on to Kedah t demand the payment of money which they said was due from th 1724 campaign.

I

Kedah in these circumstances could expect little help from her over lord, Siam. The Siamese authorities had not in fact been very interest ed in their Malayan vassals for some time. The north Malayan stata were very far from the Siamese capital, and the Siamese exerted litti direct influence. Furthermore, during the i760's Siam was again involis ed in another round of her long drawn-out quarrel with Burma, ad at this stage the Burmese were the more successful. In 1767 the Bur mese army had attacked and destroyed the Siamese capital of Ayuthi\* situated about forty-five miles

công hiến tuổi  
thanh xuân của mình

đã có từ lâu

cách cửa sông Chao  
Phraya khoảng 45 dặm

from the mouth of the Chao Phrayi River. The Siamese were in the process of moving their capital further down stream; in fact they were establishing the beginnings of what is now Bangkok. Thus in the late 1760's and early 1770's the Siamese had little interest in the troubles of Kedah. It was because of this that the Sultan became fairly desperate for help against the marauding Bugis; and he approached an English trader named Francis Light to see whether the English would provide some assistance. This was in 1771. In return for such assistance the Sultan of Kedah was willing to allow the English to establish a trading settlement in Kedah. However the English East India Company did not wish to become involved in the political affairs of the Peninsula by aiding Kedah against the Selangor Bugis, and the Sultan of Kedah withdrew his offer. We shall see below how this first offer to the English was in fact to lead later to something much more definite, the establishment of a British settlement in Penang.

### **DUTCH CONFLICT WITH THE BUGIS**

On this occasion Kedah, without any outside assistance, was defeated by Raja Haji who then retired from the area of the Peninsula to continue his mercenary career in Borneo. It was while he was there that Raja Haji heard of the death of Daeng Kemboja, the under-King in 1777. He returned immediately and had himself installed as the fourth under-King in place of Daeng Kemboja's son, Raja Ali. Raja Haji established himself in Riau and

for some time the new under-Kin lived on good terms with the Dutch, although he himself was a determined and ambitious man and Dutch power was obviously declining. Then in 1782 a quarrel between the Dutch and Raja Haji broke out.

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After the capture of an English opium ship at Riau: despite an agreement the Dutch refused to give the Bugis any share of the proceeds from the capture. Relations had already become strained because the Bugis were using Riau as a centre for exporting smuggled tin from the Peninsula. As a result the Bugis began to attack Dutch shipping in the Straits of Malacca.

This provoked the Dutch to send a fleet to capture Raja Haji's capital at Riau, but the Bugis put up strong resistance and the Dutch attack was not successful. The Bugis now quickly switched to the offensive, and in 1784 their combined armies laid siege to Malacca. Raja Haji and his men from Riau landed to the south of the city while the Sultan of Selangor and his forces attacked Malacca from the north.

The Bugis siege of Malacca lasted from January 7th to June 24th, 1784, a long siege in which the Bugis were finally unsuccessful because they were unable to capture the fortress. Such failure, as we have seen in the past, always decided the battle. To capture a fortress as strong as that at Malacca the attackers needed two things on their side: either siege guns

powerful enough to breach the walls of the fort or command - of the sea to enable the garrison to be starved into submission. When the Dutch captured Malacca they had command of the sea; when the Portuguese captured the city they had overwhelming fire power from their ships. But the Bugis in 1784 had neither advantage; they could not breach the walls; neither could they prevent the arrival of Dutch reinforcements.

These reinforcements from Batavia arrived just in time, and they included quite large numbers of soldiers. They landed outside the city and as a result the Bugis were surrounded by the new arrivals and the defenders in the fortress. In the battle which followed, the fighting was very fierce and the Dutch lost over seventy men. Raja Haji himself was killed while the battle was at its height and after that disaster; the Bugis began to retreat, having lost nearly five hundred men. Once again the city had been saved by A Famosa.

Now that their reinforcements had arrived, the Dutch took the offensive. The same fleet that had come to Malacca from Batavia now moved against the Bugis stronghold in Selangor. Here the Dutch were again successful and the Sultan was forced to escape to Pahang. The Dutch fleet then turned southward against Riau itself where the Bugis fleet was defeated. As a result the Bugis were expelled from the Johore Empire which was now to be protected by the Dutch. By agreement (1785) they were to have a garrison in

Riau as well as a Resident. In effect the Sultan of Johore had merely exchanged one overlord for another, although under the new system he and his chiefs did have more control over the actual administration.

In the same year, 1785, the Sultan of Selangor, returning to his state drove the Dutch out of Selangor with assistance from Pahang and regained possession of his territory. Soon afterwards he was in contact with the newly established English settlement in Penang to obtain further protection against the Dutch. While Selangor was successful in keeping the Dutch away from actual settlement and further interference, the same could not be said of Riau. In 1787 the Dutch took over almost the entire administration of the island and its immediate dependencies, the islands nearby. Administrative control over the mainland had virtually ceased to exist, and Sultan Mahmud was again no more than a puppet ruler. This was naturally enough a position which he did not like, so in the same year he encouraged Lanun pirates (from the southern part of the island of Mindanao) to attack Riau, and they drove away the Dutch garrison. However very soon he had to flee himself when the Lanuns left and the Dutch returned. He was now a wanderer without a capital, a ruler without a kingdom. Sultan Mahmud was to remain in this predicament until agreement was reached with the Dutch in 1795 that the Malays should return to Riau. As it happened, by the time arrangements had been made for this agreement, the Dutch were no longer in control of Malacca, and it was from

the British that Sultan Mahmud finally recovered his island capital.

#### THE DECLINE OF THE BUGIS

The period of Malayan history with which we have been dealing in this chapter was largely dominated by the Bugis, and the period itself comes to a fairly natural end in the mid-1780's rather than in 1795. The failure to capture Malacca together with the defeats in Selangor and Riau mark the decline of the Bugis influence in Malaya. And although we shall see that there was a Bugis under-King in Johore until the Empire finally disappeared, the Bugis 'golden age' was in fact over. It was the Dutch who finally brought the period of Bugis dominance to an end, but it was not in fact the Dutch who were to benefit from their decline. Those who were to benefit were the new arrivals, the British, who had established a settlement on Pulau Pinang in 1786, and it was the English East India Company which was to replace both the Dutch and the Bugis in the nineteenth century.

The Bugis had left few positive results in Malaya apart from the establishment of the Sultanate of Selangor. They were not very interested in politics and administration, but rather in wealth and adventure. Thus although they were immigrants as well as sailors and merchants, they took little interest in the countries which they conquered. The Bugis by their neglect were largely responsible for the break-up of the Johore Empire and the fragmentation of southern Malaya. They were, of course, very interested in Selangor, the state which they themselves had founded, but the other

Bugis thống trị  
nhiên

chủ yếu do người  
khá tự

để

states of the Peninsula were only important to the Bugis when they could be used to further Bugis policy. Thus in the long run Bugis political influence in Johore was disastrous, for the interests of Johore were largely neglected, so much so that the break-up of the Empire was presided over by the Bugis under-King. We shall see in the following chapter how the division of Johore was made permanent when the British purchased the island of Singapore in 1819.

Although the Bugis had been the dominant influence in Malayan affairs throughout the major part of the eighteenth century, there were also large areas of the Peninsula where they were little known. We have seen above how, on occasions, the Bugis had attacked Kedah, a state that was nominally subject to Siam. However, during the middle of the century especially, Siamese interest was largely concentrated on their conflict with Burma. Thus although Kedah still remained under Siamese suzerainty, the Bugis were able to interfere there. This policy was also followed in another west-coast state, Perak, which found itself sandwiched between the Bugis in Selangor and the Siamese-supported Kedah in the north and we have seen how Perak was subjected to periodic pressure from the Bugis. The other main power on the west coast was the Minangkabau in the territory inland from Malacca—Naning, Sungei Ujong and Rembau. These Minangkabau settlers from Sumatra had been living in these areas since the time of the Malacca Sultanate when they had originally been Hindus, they had later become Muslims and their inter-

lợi ích của  
Johore đã phần bị lãng quên



related tribes had established small states which owed allegiance to the Sultan of Johore. We have seen how the Dutch in Malacca had taken over the state of Janing but the others continued in allegiance to Johore. As a result, during the eighteenth century they too came under Bugis domination. M also suffered periodic interference. The defeat of the Bugis in the 74

^ Making of Modern Malaya  
mid-1780's brought relief to the Minangkabau as to the other Mala states and enabled these small tribal units to come together to form loose coalition—the forerunner of the Negri Sembilan—and because of the decline of Johore this confederacy was established outside Johore's direct control.

#### KELANTAN, TRENGGANU AND PAHANG

On the east coast of Malaya the northern sultanates of Kelantan and Trengganu were in the same relation to Siam as was Kedah; that is, the rulers acknowledged Siamese suzerainty by sending the annual tributes of the bunga emas (the golden flowers). This was a symbolic gift of flowers made of gold signifying the allegiance of the donoi although the states themselves were usually left to look after their own affairs with very little supervision from Siam. Munshi Abdullah's account of his voyage to Kelantan gives an early nineteenth-century account of these two states, which, because of limited trading opportunities, were little visited by foreigners. It is not untrue to say that the east-coast states played little part in Malayan history at this time. This was because they were nominally

under Siamese suzerainty but was also because there was no trading reason why there should be much contact with the other states of the Peninsula.

The other east-coast state, Pahang, was still part of the Johor Empire but was the one part which was not dominated by the Bugis. It gradually became the most independent of the territories subject to the Bugis under King and as the eighteenth century progressed Pahang's ties with Riau became less and less strong. Pahang itself was controlled by the Johore Bendahara and his family, and the Bendahara himself became virtually an independent ruler in the nineteenth century when the Johore Empire finally disappeared.

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#### THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS

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b: political situation in the Malay Peninsula in the last fifteen years of the eighteenth century, as we have seen, was one of disunity. In the north there

was fairly loose Siamese control over the states of Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, although after the end of the Thai-Siamese wars in the 1770's this control began to be tightened up. Further southwards Perak was an independent state suffering sometimes from attacks from Kedah and sometimes from interference by the Bugis in Selangor. Selangor itself was an independent Bugis state, further southwards again there were the Minangkabau states forming loose confederation, and at this period, virtually independent of each other and of Johore. Malacca was still held by the Dutch, and Pahang, though part of the Johore Empire, was controlled by the Bendahara (of Johore) and was rapidly becoming independent of the Johore Sultan's control. The Sultan of Johore also had little influence over the mainland area of Johore itself which, because he was living on the land of Riau, was dominated by another major official, the Temenggong. Finally in Riau itself the Sultan was under pressure on one side from the Dutch and on the other side from the Bugis. We have seen that the strength of both the Bugis and Johore had declined in relation to that of the Dutch in the latter years of the century. But the Dutch East India Company itself also presented a false appearance of strength. Because of the payment of high dividends in Holland and because of corruption amongst its employees in the East, the Dutch Company's financial position had become very weak. Dutch involvement in the European wars of the 1790's proved to be the final disaster and the bankrupt Company came to an end in 1799.

; This picture of a divided Peninsula was to be further complicated in the 1780's by the fact that the British East India Company began to take an interest again in the Malayan Archipelago.

The reader will remember that at the beginning of the seventeenth century both the English and the Dutch had begun trading ventures to Asia in order to obtain some share of the spice trade. It will also be remembered that Drake's circumnavigation of the world in 1577-9 showed that Portuguese and Spanish control could be breached. As a result of this knowledge the Dutch and the English had sent trading ships to Asia and had established trading centres in the Malayan Archipelago. Of the two, the Dutch had been much more successful for they had concentrated their resources in one company in order to eliminate rivalry amongst themselves and had obtained government support. The English had been much less well organized and eventually had found Dutch competition too much for them in South-East Asia. The English East India Company did not disappear entirely from South-East Asia after Amboina in 1623 as there was a trading post at Mantan until 1682. But thenceforth it concentrated on India itself, the latter's trade being considered more important than spices. The East India Company had an official monopoly of trade between England and the East, while trading ventures to South-East Asia from India were mainly in the hands of such free-lance merchants based in India itself as Alexander Hamilton, the English captain, mentioned on page 66.

Như các bạn đã biết

cũng cần

Và các bạn

Cách thức tổ chức của người Anh kém hơn nhiều họ

## BRITISH TRADING INTERESTS IN EASTERN ASIA

English concentration in India eventually proved most fruitful and as a result of the Seven Years' War against her main rival, France, England had, by 1763, become the dominant European trading power in the subcontinent. A number of factors now caused the East India Company to show a new interest in South-East Asia. As has been said the activities of the East India Company were largely concentrated on trade between Britain and India, with the trade in the areas of South-East Asia (called 'the country trade') in the hands of merchants who were not directly associated with the Company but who nevertheless had their headquarters in India. However, there was one very vital trading contract which was firmly in the hands of the East India Company, and that was the trade with China or more particularly the export of tea from China to Europe.

The China trade came to be of very great importance to the East India Company during the second half of the eighteenth century to it was also of very great importance to Britain itself. It was important in two ways: first for the profit it brought the Company and second for the revenue it brought the British Government by means of the tax on tea imports. In 1785, over sixteen million pounds worth of tea was imported into Britain; in 1787, over twenty million pounds; between 1823 and 1833 the tea imports averaged thirty million pounds a year. The British Government obtained a

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great deal of revenue from this trade and therefore the China trade came to be an extremely important and valuable part of Britain's interests in the East. It was also a temptation to enemies of England.

: As has been mentioned, after 1763 Britain eliminated her main rival, France, from the Indian subcontinent. However, it was likely that the French would in the future try to recover the position which they had lost, or at least make an attempt to damage Britain's interests, realizing where Britain's potential weakness lay, the East India Company, as early as 1763, gave instructions to look for a suitable site for a port on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal.

During the north-eastern monsoon, from October to May, the eastern coast of India suffers from storms in much the same way as does the east coast of Malaya. Today Malayan fishermen cannot put to sea during the monsoon period, and similarly during the days of failing ships, the British navy could not easily put to sea from the port of Madras at that time of year. The nearest sheltered port which the navy could use while protecting British merchant ships on the eastern route was Bombay. But this was too far away to be of much use for defensive purposes in the Bay of Bengal. Therefore any unfriendly power which had a port on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal would cause havoc among British ships during the months of the north-east monsoon. From 1763 to 1783 the British looked at many possible places for a port: Acheh, Ujung Salang, the Nicobar Islands, the Andaman Islands, and

Kedah. But nothing was established until after the set-backs which the British suffered during the War of American Independence. In this war the Americans were helped by the French and the Dutch and a French fleet commanded by an Admiral named Suffren caused much damage to British shipping in the East during 1782 and 1783. The Dutch ports in the East Indies (now Indonesia) also were closed to the British in time of war, and thus the need for a British port on the sea route to China became even more urgent. It was necessary to have a port usable during the north- last monsoon, a port which could be used to protect the China trade 78

The Making of Modern Malaya especially from Britain's European rivals. These factors primarily affected the East India Company and the British Government. But one other factor appealed to the British and Indian merchants engaged in the 'country trade'; they also would have much to gain from the establishment of a British-controlled port which would enable them to breach the Dutch monopoly in the South-East Asian trade.

These then are the three main reasons for the renewal of British interest in South-East Asia: first, the need for a naval base on the sheltered side of the Bay of Bengal; second, the need for a port along the China trade route which could be used for refitting, re-victualling and protecting the merchant ships; and third the need for a port which could be used by British and Indian merchants trying to expand their trade in the

Malayan Archipelago and more particularly to obtain it for the East India Company to sell to China. The Straits Settlements later became the headquarters for these merchants. The primary impulse to establish a British port, then, was strategic and protective but the fact that Penang was eventually chosen in 1786 was economic because it was largely due to a 'country trading captain', Francis Light, who had found an owner willing to sell a possible site.

Francis Light had earlier considered the establishment of a post in the region of Kedah, a state which he knew quite well and with whose ruler he was on friendly terms. In 1771 Light had written to the East India Company about the question of obtaining a trading station in the area of the Malacca Straits. He said that the Sultan of Kedah was willing to approve the establishment of a post in Kedah but that in return the Sultan wanted help against the Bugis from Selangor which as we have learned, were causing trouble in his state. We have all seen that Kedah was in fact under the general influence of Siam whose King was the Sultan's overlord, but at this time Siam was in the process of recovering from the disastrous Burmese wars and had little help to spare for Kedah. It was in such circumstances that the Sultan looked for other sources of assistance. But in the 1770's the East India Company showed little or no interest in Light's proposal, and the matter seemed to have been forgotten.



## PENANG

Interest in a base on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal revive after the reverses suffered by the British during the War of America Independence. Light's earlier suggestion was remembered, and tl country merchants who wanted to challenge the Dutch monopoly!

The Establishment of the Straits Settlements 79

She spice trade were enthusiastic supporters. This was in 1785, and flight himself was sent to open negotiations with the Sultan of Kedah, [he Sultan eventually agreed by letter to allow the East India jiompany to establish a settlement on the island of Penang which lie Company preferred to the mainland because it seemed easier to jontrol. The conditions stipulated by the Sultan included compensa- ion for Kedah's loss of trade, i.e., an annual payment of \$30,000 and rotection against the Sultan's enemies both from the interior and jpm the sea. The former referred to Siam, for the Sultan viewed with farm the renewed interest of the Siamese Government in his state, pbere was little doubt that the Sultan would only be willing to cede mang if he received protection in exchange, and Light had pointed us out to the authorities in India. Light therefore communicated the titan's conditions to his superiors who in the meanwhile authorized im to go ahead with the establishment of the settlement and ^pointed him as the first Superintendent.

|Light landed on Pulau Pinang in July 1786, and on August nth Icially took possession of the island, which was

largely uninhabited, [the name of the British Government. He also renamed it Prince of feles Island, a name which never became very popular. As yet no ficial treaty had been signed between the Company and Kedah, and i it turned out, Light had obtained possession of the island under hat amounted to false pretences. He had virtually promised to assist he Sultan of Kedah against Siam but in so doing had made a commit- jent which the Company was unwilling to honour: 'the Governor- eneral in Council has already decided against any measures that lay involve the Company in military operations against any of the intern princes' (Letter of January 1788).

gThe Sultan now determined to regain possession of the island for it lemed that he had given it away without receiving what he wanted I return, and in 1791 he assembled a fleet in the Prai River for the prpose of attacking Penang. Light took the initiative instead and [Racked the Sultan's fleet before it had time to begin the offensive, the forces assembled by the Sultan of Kedah were defeated and the jew settlement was preserved, for the Sultan made no further attempt tt armed attack. Realizing that it was too late to retake Penang, the jiiltan agreed to sign a definite treaty with the Company later the jjme year (1791). By this treaty the Company agreed to pay the Sultan fee sum of \$6,000 per year, but there was no mention of providing him pth protection against Siam.

L,ight could now turn his attention to the consolidation of the new settlement. Already in 1788 he had

written to the Governor-General in India stating that the only way Penang could prosper was by being made a free port. Only in this way, he said, could trade be attracted away from the Dutch. This recommendation of Light was followed. Between 1788 and 1801 Penang was a free port, and its success in building up trade by this means provided the model which Raffles was later to follow in Singapore. By 1794 when he died Light had established the settlement of Penang on firm foundations, and its population had increased to 8,000, a population composed of many immigrant races: Chinese, Indians and Bugis amongst others. There is no doubt that the free-port facilities which Penang offered led to this rapid increase in population, but the administration of the Settlement on the other hand did not obtain enough revenue to pay for its expense. It had to receive financial assistance from the Government of India to meet the annual deficit. Despite the fact that the value of Penang's trade was \$1 1/2 million, the annual deficit on administration was about \$700,000 per year. The government received little direct benefit from trade, and the officials themselves were more interested in trade than administration. Land was sold so cheaply that it was practically given away and there was little official development of the island. It was therefore decided in 1801 to introduce a 5 per cent tax on imports and exports to raise revenue and to reduce the expense of Penang to the Indian government. Penang was thenceforth no longer a free port.

In the early days of the new

settlement's life the East India Company was not entirely sure of the success of its acquisition. It was expensive and was bringing them little advantage. However, during the French Revolutionary War, Penang proved a useful base: for example, it 1795 when the British took over Malacca from the Dutch and in 179) when an expedition was sent to capture Spanish-held Manila. Both Holland and Spain had been overrun by France during the French Revolutionary Wars and Britain wished to make sure that the French did not have the use of Dutch and Spanish possessions in the East. The expedition to Manila was able to obtain supplies at Penang on its voyage to the Philippines.

Penang had now proved useful and had increased its prospects and permanency. Thus in 1800 the East India Company bought from the Sultan of Kedah for \$4,000 per year a strip of territory on the mainland opposite the island. The purpose of this acquisition (to be called Province Wellesley after the Governor-General of India) was twofold

1. The Establishment of the Straits Settlements

2. To protect the harbour of Penang by giving the Company possession of both shores. Secondly it gave the Company land on which to grow food for the increasing population of the settlement. In the geographical circumstances such food could not be grown on the island. After the Siamese invasion of Kedah in 1821 the Province received a great increase in population, as many people in fled

from the Siamese attack, the permanent occupation of Penang was now assured, and the India Company had great hopes for its expansion. Anticipating, or prematurely, the settlement's increase in importance, the company in 1805 created Penang the fourth Presidency of India (the others were Bombay, Madras and Calcutta). This made the settlement seem too important and burdened its administration with large numbers of expensive officials making it even less able to balance its budget.<sup>1</sup> Between 1805 and 1810 the Indian Government had great hopes of developing Penang as a naval base, but the timber available on the island was of little use for ship building, and in 1810 it was decided to use Trincomalee in Ceylon for this purpose, during the period of the long drawn-out wars between Britain and France (1793-1815) Penang never really fulfilled the hopes which the company had for it. The picture presented is one of disappointment; hopes had been raised. Nothing seemed to quite work out as expected. Free trade did not bring in revenue, the administration was expensive, it did not have the requisite materials for a successful naval base, and during the war, the newly established coffee and pepper plantations on the island did not prosper. A further blow in 1811 was the capture of the Dutch possessions in Java by the British, for, instead [of using Penang, it was now possible for British ships to use Batavia [which was much more in the centre of South East Asian trade. The Dutch for the time being were removed as

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<sup>1</sup> Một trong số các quan chức được cử tới Penang tại thời điểm đó với chức vụ Thứ Trưởng là một người đàn ông còn trẻ tên là Stamford Raffles

competitors, but as a result [the greater part of the region's trade still bypassed Penang.

[\* The year 1811-6 were prosperous years for the country traders [from India. The removal of the Dutch eliminated the rivals who [had previously excluded almost all competition, but Penang which had been established as a trading settlement with the encouragement of these same country traders did not benefit. The country traders preferred to use Batavia, for geographically Penang lay only on the outskirts of the trade of the Indonesian Archipelago. It was in

'One of the officials sent to Penang at this time in the junior position of Assistant [Secretary was a young man called Stamford Raffles.

fact too far away from the spice islands and from the main centres of trade. This point is sharply illustrated after the establishment of another British settlement in Singapore in 1819. Singapore because of its geographical position began to prosper immediately while the comparative decline of Penang continued. Throughout the nineteenth century Penang was always less prosperous than Singapore because its trading opportunities were more limited.

While Penang was therefore something of a disappointment to the East India Company, Singapore was an almost instantaneous success. However before relating the circumstances of the establishment of Singapore we must first look at the second of the Malayan settlements to come into British possession—Malacca.

## THE BRITISH IN MALACCA

As has been mentioned Malacca was occupied by the British in 1795 during the War of the French Revolution. By the Treaty of The Hague (1795) between Holland and France, the former was reluctantly brought into war against Britain, and the French supposedly were able to have full use of Dutch naval bases and possessions around the world, for example the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon and Java, as well as Malacca. In order to forestall French use of the bases, Britain came to an agreement with the Dutch Government-in-exile that Britain would take over various Dutch possessions for the duration of the war. It was in these circumstances that Malacca was occupied without resistance in 1795. The Malacca that the British acquired for the duration of the war was a town with a population of about 15,000, larger than the newly established Penang. As we have seen in previous chapters, the commercial importance of Malacca had declined while the town was in the possession of the Dutch, and its main use had become that of a 'guard post' for the enforcement of Dutch attempts to monopolize trade in the Archipelago. British occupation of Malacca was to be only temporary; the town was to be returned to the Dutch at the end of hostilities. However the British authorities in Penang did not look forward to the return of Dutch control. It would mean that the Dutch would try to reimpose their monopoly of trade, and Penang's hopes of becoming the centre of the Malayan tin trade would be thwarted. The East India Company therefore began its

administration of Malacca by planning its permanent decline. If the town was to be returned to the Dutch, it would be a town of almost no importance.

| In 1795 Malacca had fallen into British hands easily, almost voluntarily, the first time the town had changed hands since 1641. [Considering the number of times Malacca had successfully withstood ; siege after siege this was certainly a quiet exchange. However the significance of this easy acquisition was not lost on the East India Company for they realized that they would never have such an opportunity again; they realized that to capture Malacca from the Dutch would require stiff fighting. The Company therefore decided to remove Malacca's invulnerability by destroying the famous fortress which had for so long been the key to its successful defence. Therefore .between the years 1806-7 Malacca's fortress was systematically destroyed. It is ironic that Malacca's most famous building was in fact demolished without purpose because the British again occupied Malacca by peaceful means in 1824. The fortress took a long time to be destroyed and from contemporary accounts in the Hikayat I Abdullah it was a very difficult job of demolition

The destruction of A Famosa was the first step taken by the British to weaken Malacca. The second was a proposal to move the entire population to Penang so that when the Dutch returned they would find nothing but a derelict 'ghost' town. However, the proposal was easier to make than to carry out for it was very unlikely that



the long- established inhabitants of Malacca would voluntarily give up their homes and move to another town. It was at this juncture, in 1808, that

■ Stamford Raffles came to Malacca from Penang on holiday. He had become interested in Malay history and traditions, and this partly ^accounts for his interest in Malacca. He felt that Malacca was the historical centre of Malaya and as such should be preserved rather than destroyed. Although unasked, he submitted a report to his superiors advocating the retention of the settlement. He put forward three reasons: (a) if Britain gave up the settlement someone else would ; occupy it to the loss of Penang; (b) Malacca itself was of historical [importance and it did not cost money to administer; and (c) Britain j had invited the population to remain there after the Dutch departure [; and therefore this pledge to the population should not be broken. His farguments were well received and as a result of his intercession ^Malacca was reprieved. The East India Company decided that no Lattempt would be made to transfer large numbers of the population land that Malacca should continue to be administered as a going \* concern.

r In 1815 the Napoleanic wars in Europe came to an end and Britain's 84 The Making of Modern Malaya excuse for holding Dutch possessions in Asia ended. She no longer had any need to prevent the use of the possessions by France. As previously? agreed by Britain, Holland's overseas territories were to be returned; to her when the war was over. In these

circumstances Malacca reverted to the Dutch although they did not occupy the town again until 1818.' We shall see below, however, that Malacca was only to return to the Dutch for six years.

## THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SINGAPORE

We must now turn to the third of the Straits Settlements, Singapore, which was the second to be established by the British in Malaya. But; first of all we must say a little about the person who was primarily responsible for founding Singapore and whom we have already mentioned as the official who prevented the destruction of Malacca in 1808.

Thomas Stamford Raffles  
Thomas Stamford Raffles was born in 1781 on board a ship captained by his father that happened at the time to be in the West Indies. He was brought up in England where he received an average education. At the age of about fifteen he obtained employment as a clerk in the London office of the East India Company. He soon attracted the attention of his superiors by his industry and ambition and was eventually selected to go to the East in the service of the Company. Thus (in 1805) at the age of twenty four he was posted to Penang as one of the assistant secretaries in the government. Soon after his arrival in Penang he became a fluent Malay speaker; in fact he had begun to study the language on the voyage out from England. As a result he became the administration's expert in Malay and an interpreter to the government. He progressed from language to an

interest in custom\* history and culture, and it was while pursuing these interests that, a( we have seen, Raffles went to Malacca in 1808. He had read aboiif Malacca being the historical centre of Malay culture in the Peninsulaj and he had gone there to collect manuscripts. He was astonished that the directors of the East India Company should consider the abandon- ment of a town of such historical importance and, as we have said, hi considered that the Company also had an obligation towards th( inhabitants. He outlined these views in a personal dispatch to thi Company and at the same time mentioned the possibility of tto extension of British influence to other parts of the Archipelago.

### The Establishment of the Straits Settlements

This dispatch of Raffles, not the usual thing to be submitted by a ^fairly junior employee of the Company, brought him to the notice of rLord Minto, the Governor-General of India under whose jurisdiction fPenang and Malacca lay. Lord Minto was already considering the ;further reduction of other Dutch possessions in Eastern Asia after the capture of the Moluccas in 1808, and Raffles impressed him as one who knew more than was usual about the affairs of the Malayan world.

' Lord Minto was in fact seriously considering the capture of Java from the Dutch, for in 1810 Holland itself had been annexed by Napoleon. In 1810 Raffles was summoned to Calcutta. As a result of this visit jRaffles was appointed the Governor-General's Agent to the Malay states

with his headquarters in Malacca. From there he was to prepare the way for the invasion of Java. In this capacity Raffles obtained much detailed information about affairs in the region. In 1811 Lord Minto called at Malacca with the British expedition en route to Java. He took Raffles with him and, after a campaign which proved reasonably easy, he appointed Raffles as Lieutenant-Governor of Java, at the age of thirty.

Raffles' term of service in Java does not really concern the history of Malaya although it was perhaps one of the most fruitful periods of his life. However the years spent in Java were to indirectly affect the future course of Malayan history. Raffles' administration of Java was concentrated on making the government pay its way, a thing which the Dutch had not been able to do in the latter years of the eighteenth century. Raffles wanted the British to keep Java permanently, but he knew that the Company was reluctant to do so because of the possible expense involved. Raffles introduced many liberal ideas into Java—and reforms and land distribution, abolition of feudal services and the freeing of trade—but unfortunately he was not to remain in the country long enough to see his plans mature to success. It is also true that Raffles' administration in Java still cost the Company money.

## I THE RETURN OF DUTCH POSSESSIONS

The reason for the return of the Dutch possessions in Eastern Asia in 1815 was almost entirely due to European considerations. Britain fed

in 1815 brought to a successful conclusion a war which they had been fighting against the French since 1793. At the peace conference in Vienna almost all the countries of Europe wished to make sure that France would never cause so much trouble.

One of the main aims of the Congress of Vienna. The British felt that France should not be surrounded by many weak states, for this might tempt her towards further aggression. Holland as one border state therefore had to be strong, and Britain considered that Holland would not be sufficiently strong without her overseas possessions. It was therefore decided to strengthen Holland's position in Europe that her possessions in east Java, the Moluccas and Malacca were returned to her. These decisions were naturally opposed by Raffles who was very much against seeing the re-imposition of the Dutch policy of monopoly in South-East Asia. But his protests weighed little with the British Government, and his supporter, Lord Minto, was no longer Governor-General in India. Thus his long-term plans for the establishment of British protection over the states of the Archipelago were discarded, and in 1816 Raffles returned to England.

Raffles, now Sir Stamford Raffles, came back to the East again in 1817 as Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen, an insignificant British trading post on the west coast of Sumatra. From here he continued to plan for the extension of British influence in South-East Asia.

British trade was likely to be completely excluded by the Dutch,

who were not only imposing their monopoly policy but were extending it. He considered that Britain had to have a centrally located settlement. Before he had left England, Raffles had written to George Canning (the future Foreign Minister) suggesting Bangka or Bintan as suitable places, but the British Government had no wish to antagonize the Dutch by following Raffles' suggestions; and Raffles' attempts in Bencoolen to make treaties with the local rulers only produced reprimands from London. However he was again to be fortunate in; finding an influential supporter in the Governor-General in India, this time Lord Hastings. Raffles continued to bombard the Government: of India with his suggestions and eventually he was again summoned; to Calcutta in 1818 where he outlined his plans for establishing^ British settlement to the south of the Malay Peninsula.

The Governor-General was impressed by the arguments put forward: and gave Raffles permission to proceed with the establishment of such: a settlement. Raffles left Calcutta towards the end of 1818 and proceed\*: ed first of all to Penang where he found that his plans for a rival settlement were not well received. He then set sail further south going: first to the Carimon Islands where he found that there was nd suitable harbour and then to \*the island of Singaporef where he landed off January 28th, 1819.

#### RAFFLES AND THE RULERS OF JOHORE

What did Raffles know about the island of Singapore? How could : he be sure that there was a possibility of

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establishing a British settlement there? We must now return to the history of Johore and to the point where we left the story in the previous chapter. Raffles was well informed about Malay affairs, and there is little reason to think that he was not in possession of the facts of recent Johore history. In 1795 Sultan Mahmud had returned to Riau and established himself as the nominal ruler of what remained of the Johore Empire. We saw in the last chapter that large parts of the Johore Empire were no longer under his real control or even under the control of the actual ruler of Johore, the Bugis under-King. In theory Johore now consisted of the mainland area (roughly the present states of Johore and Pahang) together with a number of islands to the south, including Singapore, Riau and Lingga. The capture of Malacca by the British had removed the Dutch influence for the time being and permitted the Bugis to regain their old position. Sultan Mahmud disliked the return of the Bugis for they became the masters of his kingdom in place of the Dutch, and eventually he moved away from Riau to Lingga where he lived in semi-retirement.

It was at Lingga that Sultan Mahmud died in 1812, and his death immediately provoked a crisis over the succession to the throne. Nothing had been decided about the succession, for the matter was somewhat complicated. The Sultan had had four wives: two of them were royal, and two were commoners. Both the royal wives were childless, but there were two sons by the other wives: the elder was Tengku

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lại câu chuyện mà chúng ta đã đề cập ở  
chương trước

Hussein, the younger Tengku Abdul Rahman. Although Sultan Mahmud had made no official pronouncement over the succession it would seem that he intended his eldest son, Tengku Hussein, to follow him to the throne, for he had arranged marriages for him with relatives of the two major chiefs of the Johore Empire, the Bendahara and the Temenggong. In fact Tengku Hussein was with the Bendahara in Pahang when his father died in 1812.

In these circumstances, that is in the absence of the elder son, the Bugis under-King decided to place the younger son, Tengku Abdul Rahman, on the throne, probably feeling that the son with the weaker claim would be more dependent on Bugis support. Tengku Hussein claimed the throne with the support of the royal wives of Sultan Mahmud, but there was little that he could do against the Bugis to assert his rights. When the Dutch returned to influence in South-East Asia, after 1815, they recognized the Bugis-selected Sultan and this recognition was also tacitly supported by the British in a treaty with the under-King in 1818. Meanwhile Tengku Hussein lived in some, what penniless exile among the islands to the south of the Malay Peninsula.

These then were the facts almost certainly known to Raffles when he landed on Singapore island in 1819. He discovered immediately ; that there were no Dutch on the island, that it possessed a most - suitable harbour and was in a very favourable geographical position. Also on the

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island was the Temenggong, the territorial chief of the southern part of mainland and the island itself. Raffles knew that he was in fact within the Dutch sphere of influence, for Singapore was part of the Empire of Sultan Abdul Rahman of Johore, who was recognized by the Dutch. The Sultan at Lingga was carefully watched over by the Dutch and would certainly not be permitted by them to give the British permission to establish a settlement on the island, a settlement which would compete with the Dutch.


The only way in which Raffles could obtain some legality for a settlement in Singapore island was by going back on the previous British recognition of Abdul Rahman as Sultan. After discussions with the Temenggong, Raffles proceeded to do just this: he recognized Tengku Hussein as Sultan and on January 6th, 1819, a treaty was signed between the newly installed Sultan who had been brought from Riau, the Temenggong and the East India Company. Raffles had obtained his site for a settlement. Writing soon afterwards to a friend in England, Raffles stated that 'a more commanding and promising station for the protection and improvement of all our interests cannot well be conceived', and 'it is impossible to conceive a place combining\* more advantages... [it is] the Navel of the Malay countries. One fine port in these seas must eventually destroy the spell of Dutch monopoly.'

By the terms of the treaty signed with the Sultan and the Temenggong, the East India Company undertook to pay



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them \$5,000 and \$3,000 annually for the right to have a trading settlement on the island. The new settlement was now in existence but its future prospects were not particularly promising. There were two main dangers, in Holland and in England. It was obvious that the Dutch would protest most forcibly against Raffles' activities, and there was also the danger of lack of support in England itself. Even the Governor-General in India had had second thoughts soon after giving Raffles permission to go 'ahead, but it had been too late to stop the expedition. Two other points were also important: firstly there was not at first much local Malay support for the British, for it was not definite how long the newcomers were going to remain and there was no wish to antagonize the Dutch. They had already seen the British leave Malacca and hand it back to the Dutch. Secondly Raffles did not receive much encouragement from the other British settlement of Penang whose Governor was jealous of Raffles' influence and success.

### THE RAPID GROWTH OF SINGAPORE

The Dutch immediately submitted protests to the British Government who were at first inclined to order Raffles to withdraw. Raffles had also made a treaty with Aceh, and the Dutch were so worried about the prospects of British influence in South-East Asia that they offered to give up their ports in India if Raffles was ordered to abandon his settlement. However communications were slow in those days and it took messages

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many weeks to pass between Europe and Asia. Any- I way the new settlement was saved by its own rapid growth which took k; place during the long drawn-out Anglo-Dutch negotiations of 1820-3. I:lit February 1819 when Raffles signed the agreement with Tengku Hussein and the Temenggong, the population of the island of Singa-pore consisted of about one hundred and fifty orang laut fishermen, some Malay followers of the Temenggong, together with a small number of Chinese who were planters of gambier. But as soon as it I was realized that Raffles at least had every intention of making the settlement permanent, the earlier misgivings of the nearby inhabitants r disappeared, and the population increased very rapidly. By June 1819 Raffles was reporting that the population had increased to five thousand and that the harbour was filled with small ships from many parts of the Archipelago. Those that came were Chinese, Bugis, and Malays from Malacca, which had now returned to Dutch control. The existence of a free-trade port naturally attracted the merchants of the fare a who for so long had been accustomed to the Dutch policy of [monopoly. By the end of 1820 the population had grown to ten thousand, and the value of Singapore's trade for that year was over jfour million dollars. By 1825 the approximate comparative trade figures for the three settlementsfvere as follows: Malacca: \$2,500,000; pPenang: \$8,500,000; Singapore: \$22,185,000. It is little wonder there-fore that the Governor of Penane. Colnpl \* very

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enthusiastic about the establishment of another, and rival, settle-ment. However, neither is it any wonder that Dutch protests eventually brought little response in England. Singapore had become too success-ful to give up to the Dutch. It was therefore by means of its own remarkable growth and success that Singapore survived the first difficult years.

Its position was finally regularized, in Dutch eyes, by the Treaty of London, 1824. This treaty was to be of very great importance to the future of the Malayan Archipelago and had very far-reaching results. In the first place the Dutch recognized Singapore as a British possession and withdrew their objections to the settlement. Secondly the two powers agreed to try to avoid future conflict by limiting their interests to distinct areas. The distinct areas were to be divided by a line drawn through the Straits of Malacca; areas south and west of this line were to be Dutch, areas north and east to be British. The islands were therefore to be within the Dutch 'sphere of influence', while the Peninsula and Singapore were to be within the British sphere. In order to begin this demarcation correctly the settlements of Malacca and Bencoolen (which were on the wrong sides of the line) were exchanged.

These were the immediate decisions, but what were the long term results of the Anglo-Dutch treaty? In return for no further Dutch influence ia the Peninsula, the British turned down, for the second time, the chance of establishing a South-East Asian

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empire by competing with the Dutch in the islands. It is interesting to speculate what would have been the results of Raffles' plans for retaining Java in 1815 and what would have happened if the British had not renounced their interest in Sumatra in 1824, (a renunciation later confirmed in 1871); for Raffles had had the vision of a large area of South-East Asia under British protection. Was this the first vision of a Greater Malaysia?

From a Malayan point of view the fact that the Dutch gave up any interest in the Peninsula meant that there was less likelihood of international competition in the Malay Peninsula, which was therefore removed from the area of international quarrels. A further result was the permanent division of the Johore Empire and the isolation of the Dutch-supported Sultan from the greater part of his former domains; Eventually, as we shall see, an entirely new ruling family (that of the; Temenggong) was established in Johore. And finally as far as Britain was concerned the agreement also meant that the sea route to China was now secure.

The last step in the consolidation of the position of Singapore was the signing of a second treaty with Sultan Hussein and the Temenggong in 1824. Once the international position of the British settlement had been recognized by agreement with Holland, the East India Company wished to make its local position on the island more secure. The first treaty in 1819 had merely given the

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Company the right to have a settlement. By the second treaty the Sultan and the Temeng- gong agreed to give over the entire island to Britain forever. In return the Sultan was paid \$33,200 and given a pension of \$1,300 a month for life, while the Temenggong received \$26,800 and a pension of \$700 per month for life. The Sultan did rather better than the Temenggong, for while the latter died in 1825, the Sultan lived in retirement at Malacca until 1835.

Thus by 1824 the three British settlements, to be known as the Straits Settlements, were well established, and as a result British influence was also established on the periphery of the Malay Peninsula. The Dutch had left Malaya for good and had been replaced by the British. But despite the fact that the latter had no trading rivals in the region of the Malay Peninsula, the extension of British influence to the Malay states did not take place for another fifty years. In the eyes of the East India Company the Settlements were primarily for the protection of the trade route to China; but as will be seen below, this was not always the only idea of the merchants in the Settlements themselves.

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## MALAYA IN THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

### BRITAIN'S POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION

THE establishment of the Straits Settlements did not bring any great immediate change to the states of the Malay Peninsula. At first it merely meant that the British were now in contact with the Peninsula instead of the Dutch; for by the terms of the 1824 Anglo-Dutch treaty the Dutch had conceded that Malaya lay within the British sphere of influence. But the British were not particularly interested in extending this influence to the Malay states and in fact for almost fifty years British policy did not look upon the Straits Settlements as beachheads for the 'invasion' of Malaya but rather as 'off-shore' trading posts having as little as possible to do with the politics of the mainland. Looking at Malayan history in the nineteenth century it perhaps seems odd that although the British had become in 1824 virtually the only European power in contact with Malaya, it was not until 1874 that Britain officially intervened in the states of the Peninsula. The main reason for this seemingly strange disinterest was that the East India Company had established the Straits Settlements for other reasons than the acquisition of territory in South-East Asia. The aim was primarily to protect the trade route to China and

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secondarily to establish trading centres for the whole Malayan region.

The political pattern of the Peninsula showed no appreciable change in the years immediately following the consolidation of the British position in 1824. The Siamese still exercised varying amounts of control over the northern states of Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, while the independent states of Perak, Selangor and the Minangkabau region had received additions in the form of the now independent states of Pahang and Johore. These latter had been part of the old Johore Empire but their territorial chiefs, the Bendahara and the Temenggong res-Malaya in the Early Nineteenth Century pectively, had now become independent rulers in practice. This was -possible because one Sultan of Johore, Abdul Rahman, was in Dutch- controlled Lingga and had no contact with the mainland; the other, Sultan Hussein, was living in virtual retirement in Singapore. As has been said, there was no immediate desire by the British to take possession of any of these states, although the British did wish to make sure that no other power made an attempt to alter the status quo. Thus with a few exceptions, which will be outlined below, the Malayan states continued to pursue their own policies for the first three quarters . of the nineteenth century.

It will be remembered that the initiative for the foundation of the Straits Settlements had been taken in India, by the Government of India. Penang had been established, Singapore had been established, i and

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Malacca had been taken over by the Government of India which was in fact the East India Company. The Settlements were looked upon as parts of the domain of the East India Company, and we have seen that Penang had been created the fourth Presidency of India in 1805. In 1826 Singapore and Malacca ceased to be the direct responsibility of Calcutta and were brought under the administration of the Penang Presidency; that is, all the Settlements were then under the charge of one government. However the Indian Government had also begun to realize that it had over-estimated the importance and status of Penang and also of the combined Straits Settlements; to equate them with the other Presidencies of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta had been wishful thinking. The Straits Settlements had acquired a top-heavy administration, and they were expensive to administer. They had an annual deficit (because of costs of administration) of about \$850,000 per year and in fact an annual deficit was to continue until 1864.

[ The result was that in 1829 the status of the Straits Settlements was reduced to that of Residency under the Governor of Bengal and this, in effect, meant that the three Settlements were to be administered as though they were part of Bengal. As a result they became more dominated by the Indian Government and more subject to the influences of Indian policy. Then in 1832 the headquarters of the Residency was moved from Penang to Singapore. This was in recognition of

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the relative importance of the two places, for Singapore had by this time developed almost three times the trade of Penang and was rapidly growing in both population and prosperity. The fact that the Straits Settlements were administered as part of India meant that the

